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Developing countries are generally faced with several options to
raise foreign capital in order to supplement domestic savings and
investment funds. Basically, these options reduce to a choice be-
tween foreign debt and equity finance. Especially fairly advanced
developing countries such as Malaysia, for which development aid
from industrialized countries is no longer available to a signif-
icant degree, are left with the alternative to borrow abroad or
to attract foreign direct and portfolio investments. In the 1970s
and early 1980s, most of the developing countries opted for ex-
ternal borrowing in the first place. The share of foreign direct
investment (fdi) in the Third World's total resource receipts
decreased from 19 per cent in 1970 to 8 per cent in 1983. Over
the same period, the role of commercial bank lending increased
from 15 per cent to 36 per cent [World Bank, 1985, p. 21].
Sometimes it is argued that the structural shift of external
financing towards borrowing contributed to the subsequent debt
crises in many developing countries. Debt inflows are assumed to
involve higher risks for the recipient country than fdi-inflows.
Debt-service schedules are fixed ex ante and, typically, are not
related to the country's ability to pay. Especially in the case
of flexible-interest loans, the risk of adverse world-market
developments is shifted from the creditor to the borrower. In
contrary, the payment of dividends in the case of fdi is closely
related to the host country's economic performance. The servicing
of non-debt creating capital inflows is more flexible because fdi
provides for risk sharing between the host country and foreign
investors. Moreover, fdi is designed for specific projects;
whereas, in the case of debt, general balance-of-payments finan-
* This paper is part of a research project on the optimal struc-
ture of capital transfers between developed and developing
countries. Financial support was provided by the Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft. Comments and suggestions to an earlier
draft by Uwe Corsepius, Ulrich Hiemenz, Nasarudin Sulaiman, and
Steven Wong are gratefully acknowledged.cing figures prominently, which may be more susceptible to an
unproductive use of foreign capital. Finally, fdi is considered
superior to debt because it provides managerial skills and tech-
nological knowledge in addition to foreign finance. Fdi may thus
help to overcome the relative scarcity of human capital in
developing countries.
According to this reasoning, developing countries would be well
advised to change the external financial structure towards more
equity participation as a means to prevent or solve foreign debt
problems . This re-orientation may include debt-equity swaps, the
establishment of mutual funds to attract portfolio investments,
the development and liberalization of domestic stock markets, as
well as the issue of "quasi-equities" such as commodity-linked
bonds [see e.g. World Bank, 1985]. Malaysia provides an interes-
ting example in this respect. In contrast to many overindebted
economies, fdi played a major role in the external financing of
this country. Consequently, the well-known argument that a sig-
nificant restructuring of foreign resource inflows is not possi-
ble, due to the sheer amount of accumulated debt, does not apply
to Malaysia. Actually, this country attempted to restructure
external financing along the proposed lines recently. The rapid
growth of external debt which averaged 30 per cent per annum in
the 1980-1986 period was reversed subsequently. Simultaneously,
the fdi-legislation was liberalized. As a consequence, approved
fdi jumped from an average of M$ 300 million (US$ 126 million) in
1983-1985 to M$ 750 million (US$ 291 million) in 1986 and M$ 614
million (US$ 239 million) in January-May 1988.
It is the principal aim of this paper to discuss whether or not
Malaysian policies towards capital inflows helped to achieve an
Once the country has borrowed and gotten into trouble, the re-
structuring of external financing is, of course, no panacea to
solve debt problems but has to be supplemented by economic
policy reforms.optimal external financial structure . The shift from debt to fdi
may prevent payment crises particularly in countries which have
engaged in cooperative financial relations with foreign lenders
and investors. On the other hand, the choice between equity and
debt may involve a risk-return trade-off between income stability
and expected growth under non-cooperative conditions. This hypo-
thesis refers to a choice-theoretic model which analyses the
international transfer of capital on the basis of the agent-prin-
cipal approach [Lachler, 198,5] . The model is summarized in Sec-
tion II, where it is also assessed whether or not the agent-prin-
cipal relationship can be characterized as cooperative in the
case of Malaysia. Subsequently, government regulations affecting
external financing have to be evaluated in order to decide what
constitutes the optimal debt-equity structure. The model pre-
dictions on the effects of debt and fdi-inflows on overall in-
vestment and economic growth in the capital recipient country are
based on the assumption that different capital inflows are per-
fectly fungible. Actually, however, government regulations not
only determine the structure of capital inflows; they are also
likely to affect the efficiency of different types of capital
inflows. In Section III, the regulatory framework governing debt
and fdi in Malaysia is analysed. This discussion results in hypo-
theses on the economic performance effects of debt and fdi, which
will be tested empirically in ongoing research. Consequently,
only tentative conclusions are presented in Section IV as far as
current policies of the Malaysian government towards capital
imports are concerned.
External debt and fdi are assessed with respect to their
effects on economic performance exclusively. The focus is on
the effects on the investment ratio, the efficiency of invest-
ments, and economic growth. The relative merits and short-
comings of debt and fdi with respect to other factors which may
enter the country's welfare function are largely neglected in
the following. For example, many developing countries are re-
strictive in allowing fdi due to concerns about foreign control
over national resources.II. Agent-Principal Relations: The Case of Malaysia
Various proposals recommending measures that would change the
external financial structure of developing countries in favour of
foreign equity participation basically refer to fdi as a risk-
sharing device. Recently it was shown, however, that this strate-
gy may involve costs in terms of lower economic growth for the
capital recipient country [Lachler, 1985; Lachler, Nunnenkamp,
1987]. Transfer negotiations between foreign lenders or investors
(principals) and capital recipients (agents) are typically sub-
ject to moral-hazard problems. Once the capital is transferred,
the agent is free to decide on how to allocate the available
funds between consumption and investment purposes. In the case of
foreign equity participation, the agent may reduce complementary
domestic investments and thus invest a smaller share of domestic
absorption as compared to a situation where foreign resources
would be available as gifts. Since the foreign investor is en-
titled to a predetermined share of the agent's future output, the
agent may improve his own welfare position by shifting domestic
absorption to current consumption. Under such conditions, the
effects of fdi on overall investment and economic growth can be
supposed to be less favourable than in the case of debt finance .
The risk-return trade-off of fdi-inflows may be overcome if the
agent is able to precommit himself credibly to a certain invest-
ment behaviour before transfers are effected. Moral-hazard prob-
lems are ruled out under such cooperative agent-principal relati-
ons. In this case, the investment response of a transfer in-
volving future repayment obligations is always greater than for
foreign gifts, irrespective of whether the transfer takes the
Moral-hazard problems arise in the case of debt finance as
well. Since the principal is entitled to a fixed sum of debt-
service payments, the agent may improve his own welfare positi-
on by switching to higher-risk projects [see also Jensen, Meek-
ling, 1976]. However, it was shown by Lachler [1985] that more
external debt always leads to more investment; whereas the
change in overall investment may be negative after increased
fdi-inflows.form of debt or fdi. It is thus important to get an idea on the
regime under which transfers are negotiated, in order to decide
whether it is favourable for developing countries such as Malay-
sia to substitute fdi for debt.
It depends on the principal's perception of the agent's invest-
ment behaviour whether or not a cooperative equilibrium is
achieved in the transfer negotiations. The agent may indicate
that he is prepared to engage in cooperative relations. Especial-
ly high investment ratios and successful mobilization of domestic
savings may provide such signals. However, it is the principal
who decides on the terms under which debt and fdi is transferred.
The terms of capital transfers in turn determine the type of
equilibrium . Information on the transfer terms is easily avail-
able for debt finance. Interest-rate spreads above LIBOR clearly
point to cooperative financial relations in the case of Malaysia.
The spreads paid by Malaysia averaged 0.42 per cent in the 1978-
1984 period [Nunnenkamp, Junge, 1985, p. 57]. This was less than
half the figure of 1.0 per cent calculated for the average of the
2
21 most important Third-World borrowers . Malaysia was even
granted substantially better credit terms than the group of bor-
rowers without major debt-servicing difficulties (0.82 per cent).
Similarly straightforward information on transfer terms is not
Moral-hazard problems in transfer negotiations threaten to
reduce the expected gains of the principal. Rational principals
would modify the terms under which transfers are made if they
anticipate a non-cooperative behaviour of agents. Given harder
(i.e., non-cooperative) transfer conditions, the agents are
then forced to a non-cooperative investment behaviour. For
example, higher interest rates render low-risk projects un-
profitable for the agent in the case of debt finance. The har-
dening of credit terms will induce the agent to shift to
higher-risk projects.
2
The calculation is based on data on interest-rate spreads for
syndicated bank loans, as presented by the Euromoney Syndicati-
on Guide. The comparison is thus not affected by the relatively
high share of credits from official sources in Malaysia's over-
all external debt.available for fdi-inflows . However, indirect evidence points to
cooperative relations in the case of fdi as well. Malaysia's in-
vestment ratio amounted to 29.4 per cent in the 1975-1986 period
[IMF, 1987]. This was about 4 percentage points higher than the
average figure for all Third-World economies as well as develop-
ing countries in Asia. The extraordinarily high investment ratio
indicated that Malaysia was prepared to engage in cooperative
2
financial relations with foreign principals . The investment
ratio peaked in 1980-1984 (about 34.5 per cent), i.e., when re-
alized fdi-inflows were extraordinarily high as well . Hence,
principals could be confident that Malaysia did not abstain from
undertaking complementary investments in order to reduce future
dividend payments to foreign investors. This is underlined by the
fact that, in 1980-1984, the domestic savings rate of Malaysia
was only 1 percentage point below the average of the 1977-1986
period and remained substantially above the average savings rate
for middle-income developing countries. Apparently, foreign capi-
Balance-of-payments data, collected from different sources by
Steven Wong, show that repatriated dividend payments exceeded
the interest payments on external debt throughout the 1979-1984
period. However, the relative terms of fdi and debt inflows
cannot be derived from such data. The aggregate figure of in-
terest payments is strongly affected by subsidized credits from
official sources. Moreover, a significant part of profit repa-
triation was undertaken by only two multinational companies
operating in the petroleum and gas sector.
2
Arguably, the nationalization of foreign-based plantation and
mining companies, following the implementation of the New Eco-
nomic Policy (see also pp. 17f.), points to non-cooperative
agent-principal relations. Apparently, however, "the NEP had
little effect on foreign investors" [Imran, Fadil, 1986, p.
180]. This may be due to several reasons. First of all, the
nationalization was selective rather than unspecific [for an
analysis of the different effects of selective versus unspeci-
fic expropriation, see Picht, Stiiven, 1988] . Secondly, "buying-
back" foreign companies is likely to have less detrimental
effects on agent-principal relations than outright expropriati-
on without adequate compensation. Thirdly, the negative effects
of the NEP on the (micro-economic) profitability of investments
might have been considerably smaller than its effects on macro-
economic performance of Malaysia.
According to the World Bank [1987], Malaysia's fdi-inflows
developed as follows (period averages in US$ million): 1975-
1979: 442; 1980-1984: 1131; 1985-1986: 612.tal inflows were largely used to finance additional investments
rather than to compensate for lower domestic savings.
From the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, it appears that
Malaysia succeeded to engage in cooperative relations with for-
eign creditors and investors. According to the underlying agent-
principal model, a risk-return trade-off is thus unlikely to
exist. Under such conditions, the optimal debt-equity ratio turns
out to be "0" in the model; i.e., risk-averse agents always pre-
fer equity finance over debt finance . Actually, however,
Malaysia experienced significant debt inflows as well, partic-
ularly in the first half of the 1980s. This points to the rele-
vance of welfare considerations of the agent which are neglected
in the model's utility function, e.g. the government's motivation
to prevent specific industries from being controlled by for-
eigners .
Ill. Government Policies and Capital Inflows
1. The Relevance of the Regulatory Framework
Traditionally, Malaysia referred to fdi as a major source of
external financing. According to balance-of-payments data, fdi
accounted for 47 per cent of total resource inflows over the
1967-1986 period; the share of debt inflows amounted to only 21
2
per cent (Table 1) . This was in sharp contrast to the external
financing structure of countries such as Chile, Mexico, Indonesia
and South Korea, all of which strongly preferred debt over fdi-
inflows . The exceptional structure of external financing in
Malaysia is likely to be due to government regulations in the
This follows from the maximization of the agent's expected
utility function [for details, see Lachler, 1985].
2
Portfolio investment (mainly public sector bonds) accounted for
the rest, i.e., 32 per cent of resource inflows.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the share of fdi in total resource
inflows amounted to about 5, 8 and 14 per cent in Korea, Chile,
and Mexico and Indonesia respectively [for details, see Corse-
pius, 1988a; 1988b; Schweickert, 1988].Table 1 - The Structure of External Financing in Malaysia 1967-1986
Foreign direct Public sector Long-term debt Short-term debt Total
investment bonds resource
inflows
US$ per cent US$ per cent US$ per cent US$ per cent US$








































































































































































































































Per-cent figures are weighted averages.
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, various issues.first place. Moreover, changes in the government's attitude
towards debt and fdi may be responsible for variations in the
relative importance of various resource inflows.
Government regulations influencing the structure of capital im-
ports can also be expected to affect the efficiency of different
types of resource inflows. The effects of fdi and debt on econo-
mic growth may differ even if the investment response was the
same for all capital imports. This is because foreign capital
inflows are typically not perfectly fungible, as was assumed in
the agent-principal model.
The government's leverage on the use and, hence, the efficiency
of capital inflows is likely to differ between the various types
of external finance. The government agent can freely dispose of
resources directly transferred to official agencies; he immedi-
ately determines the efficiency of foreign aid and public debt
for example. The government's control is less strict for other
types of capital inflows. Nevertheless the efficiency of private
debt and fdi can be influenced indirectly by the government.
Public regulations may modify the incentives of the recipients of
foreign capital as to how to use the transferred resources. The
ranking of the growth effects of different types of external
financing is thus likely to depend on the degree and nature of
public interventions concerning the transfer of foreign resour-
ces. It is mainly with respect to efficiency that the regulatory
framework for debt and fdi-inflows in Malaysia is discussed in
the following paragraphs.
2. The Case of Foreign Debt
As concerns Malaysia's policies towards external debt, three sub-
periods can be differentiated:
- Until 1980, foreign debt policies remained fairly conservative.
- In the first half of the 1980s, counter-cyclical borrowing
abroad represented an important instrument to finance the pro-
motion of heavy industries.10
- Recently, further debt inflows were discouraged due to concerns
about the sustainability of debt accumulation.
Traditionally, Malaysia's recourse to external borrowing was
insignificant. The high growth rate of outstanding debt in the
1970s (nearly 25 per cent per annum) was largely to be attributed
to the extremely low debt figure at the beginning of this period
(Table 2) . External borrowing was regarded as a residual. Bank
Negara (i.e., the Central Bank) was restrictive to allow for
foreign debt inflows since domestic finance was easily available,
which was due to the booming economy and favourable commodity
prices. Government budget deficits were largely financed through
"captive" domestic savings, e.g. from the Employees Provident
Fund. In 1971-1980, external borrowing accounted for only about a
quarter of the government's development expenditures.
Project loans granted by multilateral agencies such as the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank as well as bilateral donors
accounted for a significant share of total debt inflows through-
out the 1970s. These funds were mainly used to finance infra-
structure projects such as highways, bridges and hydroelectric
dam projects, the promotion of which was considered to be an
important input for private sector activities. Due to long gesta-
tion periods, positive growth effects were not to be expected in
the short run. Moreover, the loan-financed projects did not gene-
rate foreign exchange by their own. Nevertheless debt-servicing
difficulties were unlikely to result from public project loans.
Typically, the official creditors granted soft loan conditions,
i.e., lower than market rates of interest and long grace peri-
ods. Consequently, the debt-service ratio (interest and amorti-
zation payments relative to exports) remained still below 5 per
cent in 1980.
Total debt outstanding of M$ 1.2 billion in 1970 equalled US$
390 million at the then prevailing exchange rate of M$ 3.1 per
US$. The Ringgit appreciated over the 1970s reaching M$ 2.2 per
US$ in 1980; subsequently it depreciated to M$ 2.6 in 1986.11









































































































































aIn per cent of federal government debt. - Non-financial public
enterprises (NFPEs).
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia
The policy stance towards foreign borrowing changed remarkably in
the early 1980s. Total debt outstanding increased by 30 per cent
annually in the 1980-1986 period. Private sector debt nearly
tripled; nevertheless its share in total debt outstanding de-
creased to less than 15 per cent. The government did not inter-
vene into the allocation of private debt. Public guarantees were
not issued for this debt category. Hence, the incentives of pri-
vate borrowers to use external funds efficiently were not distor-
ted. On the other hand, capital market segmentation may have
hindered the external financing of relatively small but highly12
productive private investments. Many companies had not yet estab-
lished a credit standing in international financial markets.
Especially small manufacturing firms were not able to borrow
abroad without public guarantees. The increase in private debt in
the early 1980s was mainly to be attributed to external borrowing
by non-resident controlled companies (NRCCs) engaged in oil and
gas related activities, the financial restructuring of other
NRCCs, and real property development by some private companies.
The required approval of Bank Negara for private external bor-
rowing exceeding the equivalent of M$ 100 000 (since 1987: M$
1 million) was not difficult to get in this sub-period. However,
tight controls were introduced since 1983 [Bank Negara, various
issues].
In 1980-1983, the accumulation of external debt was largely due
to the government's attempt to sustain economic growth via ex-
pansionary fiscal policies in the face of global recession. The
federal government's budget deficits soared from M$ 3.7 billion
in 1979 to an average of M$ 10.5 billion in 1981-1983 [Imran,
Fadil, 1986, p. 51]. To a significant extent, the government
raised loans in international financial markets to cover high
deficits (Table 2). The structure of public external debt changed
drastically towards private creditors . This in turn caused the
debt-service ratio to rise to 10 and 19 per cent in 1983 and 1986
respectively; although rather low by international standards, the
latter figure was more than four times as high as the 1980-
figure. More importantly, it remains open to question whether
counter-cyclical public borrowing was used productively.
Concerns about the sustainability of public debt accumulation
induced the government to curb public spending. Comparing 1982
and 1985, budget deficits were reduced by 40 per cent. Neverthe-
less they remained high by international standards (according to
The share of official creditors in Malaysia's public external
debt decreased from 50 per cent (1975) and 44 per cent (1980)
to less than one quarter in the mid-1980s (data from Bank
Negara Malaysia).13
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IMF-data, nearly 8 per cent of GNP in 1985). Moreover, external
borrowing by non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs) was not yet
controlled strictly. The government continued to issue guarantees
for NFPE-loans. Such loans represented the fastest growing type
of debt during 1983-1986 (24 per cent per annum). NFPE-loans were
largely used to finance investment projects. However, the provi-
sion of public guarantees is likely to have weakened the incen-
tives to carefully assess the productivity of investments.
External borrowing by NFPEs in the 1980s represented a major
element in the government's strategy to broaden the industrial
base of the country via promotion of heavy industries. This in-
cluded the development of a national automobile industry; ship-
building and the production of steel and cement figured prominent
as well. In contrast to earlier announcements that the private
sector was to be assigned a greater role in economic development,
the government continued to play the central role. Both theoreti-
cal arguments and historical experience suggest that policy-in-
duced distortions in the allocation of economic resources typi-
cally give rise to inefficiencies and thus affect economic growth
negatively . In the case of Malaysia, the external financing of
NFPE-investments may have avoided the crowding out of private
investors which largely relied on domestic credit sources. How-
ever, the concentration on heavy industries was probably in con-
2
flict with Malaysia's comparative advantages . This applied espe-
cially to human-capital intensive industries such as automobile
production. In the longer run, mis-specialization is bound to
negatively affect the growth effects of investments. Costs in
This hypothesis will be tested empirically in ongoing research
on the effects of different capital inflows on economic per-
formance in Malaysia.
2
According to calculations provided by Steven Wong, the incre-
mental capital-output ratio (ICOR) increased dramatically from
an average of 3.0 in 1976-1980 to 5.4 in 1981-1985. This in-
crease represented the most important factor in explaining the
drastic decline in the critical interest rate, i.e. the maximum
interest rate to be paid without further increasing external
debt. During the first half of the 1980s, the actual interest
rate was twice as high as the critical interest rate.14
terms of reduced economic growth may also result from government
policies which aim at an improved income distribution and favour
the equity participation of specific population segments . In the
case of Malaysia, continued "attempts to expedite Bumiputra par-
ticipation in commerce and industry through direct government
involvement" [Imran, Fadil, 1986, p. 49] figure prominently in
2
this respect .
Actually, a significant portion of public and publicly guaranteed
debt has been utilized in projects which were unlikely to gene-
rate sufficient resources to service debt through their own ope-
rations [ibid, pp. 54ff.]. The performance of many NFPEs did not
live up with high expectations [see also Imran, 1988, pp.
29ff.] . Favourable effects of heavy industrialization on the
development of ancillary industries and on export performance did
not materialize in the short run. Many NFPEs asked the government
to convert non-performing loans into equity, i.e., to shift debt-
servicing problems to the federal government. The intensified
drain on the federal budget added to concerns about the sustain-
ability of debt-intensive heavy industrialization. This led to
the government's recent resolution to slow down the rate of debt
accumulation by reducing the twin deficits in the public budget
and the balance of payments.
Presently, further external borrowing is strongly discouraged by
the government. A maximum of 20 per cent was imposed for the
debt-service ratio. The decision on loan applications by private
enterprises may be delayed, the amount of loans applied for may
be reduced by means of moral suasion, or approval may be outright
refused. As far as NFPEs are concerned, the strategy of heavy
1 Arguably, such equity considerations are necessary in order to
sustain political stability. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to
assess the economic costs which might be involved.
2
Bumiputra refers to the indigenous population of Malaysia.
Several factors which were beyond their control contributed to
the failure of NFPEs, particularly the appreciation of the Yen
and other major currencies against the Ringgit, as well as the
recession in foreign and domestic markets in the mid-1980s.15
industrialization is not completely abandoned. However, a major
restructuring is aimed at, encompassing a stronger impetus on
small and medium-sized companies as well as resource-based indus-
tries, the privatization of selected NFPEs, comprehensive moni-
toring of the financial management of NFPEs, improvements in
operational efficiency, the cancellation and postponement of
projects, and the shift towards domestic financing. Direct gov-
ernment borrowing is to be reduced by assigning the private sec-
tor a greater role in economic development. Additional measures
include: diversification and lengthening of the maturity profile
of debt, in order to avoid any bunching of repayments; refinan-
cing and prepayment of high-interest bearing market loans; con-
tinuous monitoring of international financial market conditions
and an improved tuning in foreign borrowing.
The favourable current account position of Malaysia in 1987 and
ample liquidity in the domestic financial market set the stage
for the selective prepayment of external debt and its domestic
refinancing. This exercise is expected to continue. Basically,
the re-orientation in industrialization and debt policies seems
well-suited to improve the efficiency of investments and to pre-
vent major debt-servicing difficulties. Several problems remain
to be solved however. Domestic investors seem still reluctant to
trust in the government's resolution to reduce its own role in
manufacturing and to foster private initiative . Uncertainties
about the government's course in promoting the role of Bumiputras
in economic development may add to the wait-and-see attitude.
Moreover, the publicly enforced shift to domestic financing in-
volves considerable risks. Presently, commercial banks in
Malaysia are urged by the government and Bank Negara to reduce
lending rates so that domestic borrowing is relatively cheap.
Officials in Malaysia frequently argue that the privatization
drive of the government may lose impetus because of the
sluggish responsiveness of private investors and mounting unem-
ployment problems. However, exactly the remaining uncertainties
about the government's determination in assigning a greater
role to the private sector are likely to add to the reluctance
of private investors.16
However, interest rate margins are typically fairly high in
Malaysia and financial deepening is relatively poor by internati-
onal standards . Consequently, the increased demand for domestic
funds by NFPEs may result in the crowding-out of more productive
private investments and thus impair future growth prospects.
3. The Case of Foreign Direct Investment
In contrast to the traditionally conservative Malaysian attitude
towards external debt, the country has been a significant recipi-
ent of fdi since the early 1960s. Foreigners owned more than 60
per cent of the share capital in the Malaysian economy in 1970
[Imran, Fadil, 1986, pp. 162f.]. However, important changes in
the government's attitude towards fdi took place over the last
two decades. They are likely to have affected both the amount and
efficiency of fdi.
Initially, fdi was mainly attracted in agriculture and mining.
The policy focus shifted towards the promotion of manufacturing
in the late 1960s. The introduction of a new tariff schedule and
subsequent tariff increases raised the effective rate of protec-
tion in manufacturing to an average of about 40 per cent [Hoff-
mann, Tan, 1980]. This encouraged fdi in import-substituting
activities. The Industrial Incentives Act (IIA) of 1968 reflected
the government's intention to promote viable export-oriented
industries as well [Tan, Kulasingam, 1984, p. 110]. The IIA pro-
vided various investment incentives such as income-tax exemptions
Inefficiencies in financial intermediation in Malaysia are due
to several factors. Most importantly, competition among finan-
cial intermediaries is artificially reduced. The operations of
foreign banks are principally restricted to one branch. More-
over, the activities in which commercial banks and merchant
banks may engage are strictly separated. It is argued that the
protection of domestic banks is necessary since they would not
survive intensified competition. However, this is mainly due to
inefficiencies created by government interference in credit
policies. The high share of non-performing loans, for example,
can be attributed at least partly to credit quotas which have
to be extended to priority sectors at preferential interest
rates.17
and special export incentives. Fdi-inflows were largely unregula-
ted in this period. Malaysia did not introduce strict foreign
exchange controls so that foreign capital and dividends could be
transferred back easily: "The free movement of capital is guaran-
teed to foreign investors since Malaysia is a signatory of In-
vestment Guarantee Agreements, which also insure against non-
commercial risks such as expropriation and nationalization of
capital" [ibid, p. 112] .
The liberal treatment of fdi which was well-suited to generate
favourable growth effects was subject to important changes in the
early 1970s. Growing nationalistic sentiments and internal im-
balances in equity ownership caused pressure to reduce the domi-
nance of foreign control in the economy. In line with the ob-
jectives of the New Economic Policy (NEP), Malaysia's attitude
towards fdi became more regulated and selective. Foreign partici-
pation in agriculture and mining projects was strongly dis-
couraged, and the process of take-overs of plantation and mining
companies was speeded up [Imran, Fadil, 1986, p. 168]. The Pe-
troleum Development Act, in its original form of 1974, had detri-
mental effects on foreign owned oil companies. The Malaysian
owned PETRONAS was empowered with the exclusive right to exploit
petroleum resources. The NEP ensured that fdi in manufacturing
had to be in the form of joint ventures mainly. The Industrial
Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 provided a major instrument to
achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth and income. The
new guidelines required all manufacturing projects of more than
M$ 250 000 in capitalization and full-time staff of 25 and above
to be licensed under NEP-conditions. In many industries, direct
foreign participation was restricted to a maximum of 30 per cent.
This referred to domestic-market oriented industries and projects
utilizing non-renewable resources in the first place . In additi-
on to Malaysians owning the majority of shares, the equity parti-
cipation of Bumiputras was required to be at least 30 per cent.
Regulations on domestic equity participation were more flexible
for export-oriented projects. Wholly foreign owned companies
were operating in free trade zones particularly.18
The powerful Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) was established
to promote Bumiputra participation [Tan, Kulasingam, 1984, p.
112]. The selective treatment of fdi and restrictions on equity
participation continued into the 1980s. During 1980-1985 (i.e.,
before the fdi-legislation was liberalized), joint ventures with
Malaysian majority accounted for two thirds of total fdi-projects
(Table Al).
The foreign investors' reaction to the NEP and ICA differed be-
tween multinationals from different home countries. US companies
were more reluctant than Japanese companies to engage in joint
ventures, for example [ibid, p. 115]. However, overall fdi-in-
flows increased continuously in the early 1970s. The set-back in
1975 (from fairly high inflows in the previous year) may be due
to uncertainties arising from the implementation of the ICA. But
fdi-inflows recovered quickly and increased steadily until 1982.
From this it has been concluded that "the NEP had little effect
on foreign investors" [Imran, Fadil, 1986, p. 180].
This judgement is based on the development of total fdi-inflows.
The impact of the NEP on the structure of fdi and its effects on
overall investment and economic growth in Malaysia are less
clear. Several factors are noteworthy. Firstly, government
agencies and government backed corporations were frequently in-
volved in joint ventures with foreign investors by providing
public funding and holding shares in trust for later divestments
to Bumiputras [ibid, pp. 184f.; Imran, 1988, p. 29]. The signifi-
cant public contributions to joint ventures absorbed domestic
savings and external debt inflows to a considerable extent. They
can thus be expected to have crowded out private sector invest-
ments .
Secondly, the policy focus on heavy industries may have in-
fluenced the structure of fdi in a way which did not conform to19
Malaysia's comparative advantages . The evidence on the sectoral
distribution of fdi presented in Table 3 is mixed in this re-
Table 3 - Foreign Direct Investment in Manufacturing Indus-











































The interpretation is based on the assumption that Malaysia can
still be considered a country where capital is relatively
scarce. This refers to human capital in the first place. Con-
sequently, production should be concentrated on relatively
labour-intensive or standardized (i.e., less human-capital
intensive) manufacturing, in order to reap the full benefits
from the international division of labour and thus improve the
productivity of investments. It would be interesting to compare
the sectoral distribution of fdi-applications and the cor-
responding structure of approvals, in order to decide whether
or not the approval procedures involved a bias towards heavy
industries. However, data on industry-specific applications was
not available.20
spect . The production of electrical and electronic items, re-
presenting the most important area for fdi, can be considered as
2
fairly labour-intensive . On the other hand, about 30 per cent of
fdi was approved in sectors which were clearly human-capital
intensive (chemicals, basic metals, and transport equipment).
This may negatively affect the export potential and economic
growth effects of fdi in the longer run .
Thirdly, the publicly enforced majority participation of Malaysi-
an investors in joint ventures may have hindered the transfer of
technologies and managerial skills. The "reluctance of foreign
investors to pass on to locally-controlled firms their latest
technology" [Tan, Kulasingam, 1984, p. 116] rendered it difficult
for Malaysia to take full advantage of the generally assumed
superiority of fdi over debt in improving the human-capital end-
owment of developing countries.
Only recently, the Malaysian government relaxed fdi-restrictions
and granted additional incentives in order to improve the invest-
4
ment climate . Most importantly, equity participation rules were
liberalized. Since late 1986, companies selling at least 50 per
cent of output to world markets or Malaysian free trade zones may
be wholly owned by foreign multinationals. The same applies to
companies employing at least 350 full-time Malaysian workers.
Work permittances and visa requirements for expatriate staff
It is noteworthy that the development and structure of overall
fdi were strongly influenced by the fluctuation of fdi in the
petroleum sector. While petroleum and coal accounted for only 7
per cent of approved fdi in 1980-1987, the share of this sector
in total fixed assets of foreign investors in Malaysia amounted
to 17 per cent (December 1986) .
2
For the classification of industries according to factor inten-
sities, see Spinanger [1987].
Strongly export-oriented fdi accounted for about 40 per cent of
approved projects in 1980-1987 (Table A2).
A
The government's attempt to encourage further fdi was part of a
broader re-orientation in development strategies [Fifth
Malaysia Plan 1986-1990]; for the various measures introduced
in 1985-1986, see MIDA [1987].21
members were liberalized as well . Moreover, it was announced
that the new rules were to be applied in a flexible way. The
joint solution of remaining problems is aimed at by improving the
dialogue between foreign investors and the Malaysian government.
Bureaucratic procedures and delays should be kept to the minimum,
the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) acting as a
one-stop agency for foreign investors.
As a result of the liberalization measures,
2
- fdi increased by 30 per cent in 1987 (January-October) ;
- fdi-projects wholly owned by foreign multinationals gained in
importance (Table Al);
- a shift towards export-oriented fdi-projects was observed
(Table A2).
All in all, the liberalization of fdi-regulations seems well-
suited to attract more foreign investments and to improve their
productivity. However, remaining uncertainties about the future
course of fdi-legislation in Malaysia may still act as a hin-
drance to fully exploit the economic growth potential of fdi [see
also Imran, Fadil, 1986, pp. 191ff.]. The required Bumiputra
participation of 30 per cent may severely limit the choices of
foreign investors to select local partners, especially in foreign
majority fdi-projects. Moreover, the more liberal treatment of
fdi is presently restricted to project applications up to 1990 .
Other measures included: relaxation of the Industrial Coordina-
tion Act of 1975; waiver of FIC-approval for corporate share
transactions below M$ 5 million; replacement of the administra-
tively cumbersome Investment Incentives Act of 1968 by the
Promotion of Investment Act which provided a range of tax and
import duty exemptions; introduction of the New Investment
Fund Scheme; reform of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange; review
of labour laws.
2
Other factors responsible for this increase were the improve-
ment in overall economic prospects of Malaysia and the relo-
cation of investments from countries such as Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan, whose currencies appreciated against the M$.
This refers to Section C.l.b. of the Investor's Guide [presen-
ted in Imran, 1988, Appendix 4; see also MIDA, 1987, pp. 5 f.],
continued on page 2222
No final decision has been taken on the treatment of new fdi-pro-
jects in the 1990s . Finally, the revised fdi-legislation contin-
ues to discriminate against relatively small projects although
various tax incentives have been extended in the 1989-budget.
Most importantly, the relaxation of equity participation rules
does not apply to mainly domestic-market oriented companies with
less than 350 employees.
IV. Some Tentative Conclusions
In contrast to the external financial structure of most Third-
World economies, Malaysia preferred fdi over foreign debt during
much of the 1968-1987 period. Recent policy measures clearly
reflected this preference. Further debt accumulation was strongly
discouraged, whereas the fdi-legislation was liberalized. As a
result of the changes in the regulatory framework introduced in
the mid-1980s,
- the overall inflow of external finance was reduced considerab-
ly, and
- the structure of resource inflows shifted towards fdi.
Principally, the reduction of capital imports is not an end in
itself. Restrictions on resource inflows are likely to impair
future growth prospects provided that the country offers profit-
able investment opportunities which cannot be financed out of
domestic savings exclusively. Nevertheless the restrictive Ma-
i.e., fdi-projects which meet the following conditions: (i) the
foreign investor exports at least 50 per cent of his production
or employs at least 350 full-time Malaysian workers, and (ii)
the company's products do not compete with locally manufactured
products for the domestic market.
The Consultative Economic Council, recently set up by the
Malaysian government and consisting of representatives of
various interest groups, is going to submit new recommendations
concerning the policies to be followed after 1990. The common
view is that the government will continue to encourage fdi-
inflows.23
laysian attitude towards external debt may be justified. It was
mainly the government which was responsible for the significant
debt accumulation in the first half of the 1980s. Probably, ex-
ternal borrowing was used for unproductive purposes to some ex-
tent. Moreover, government guaranteed borrowing by non-financial
public enterprises was largely absorbed by heavy industrializa-
tion projects. The productivity of such investments can be sup-
posed to be relatively low. Arguably, the concentration on heavy
industrialization did not conform to Malaysia's comparative
advantages. In subsequent research, this hypothesis will be
tested empirically by comparing the growth effects of different
types of debt and fdi-inflows.
Imposing overall restrictions on further debt inflows may help to
reduce the policy bias towards heavy industries. However, this
second-best solution is likely to affect the external financing
of private sector investments as well. The problems arising from
the mis-allocation of resources should be tackled in a more di-
rect way, i.e., by revising the industrialization strategy. As
was recently announced by Malaysian authorities, the government
should rely more strongly on private initiative in identifying
and realizing the most productive investment opportunities. The
government's role in manufacturing should be reduced. Public debt
accumulation would then be controlled even though non-interventi-
onist debt policies were maintained. In this way, the external
financing of productive private investments would not be ob-
structed.
As far as the fdi-legislation is concerned, some problems remain
to be solved as well, in order to achieve an optimal external
financial structure. According to the agent-principal model out-
lined in Section II, Malaysia is well advised to strengthen the
country's attractiveness for foreign investors. Definite con-
clusions on whether or not fdi-finance involves a trade-off be-
tween economic growth and income stability (i.e., risk sharing
with foreign investors) can only be reached in ongoing empirical
research. However, the evidence presented above indicates that24
the country succeeded to engage in cooperative financial relati-
ons with foreign principals. The conceivable trade-off is unlike-
ly to exist in the case of Malaysia.
It is thus in the country's best interest to maintain and further
strengthen the liberal treatment of fdi . Remaining uncertainties
about the future course of fdi-legislation must be removed. As
far as equity participation rules are concerned,
- foreign investors must be allowed to keep the majority of
shares so that Malaysia can reap the full benefits from the
transfer of technologies and managerial skills;
- the choice of foreign investors to select local partners in
joint ventures should not be unduly limited by imposing de-
tailed minimum standards with respect to the participation of
2
specific segments of the Malaysian population ;
- remaining discriminations against relatively small fdi-projects
should be abolished.
Moreover, the efficiency of fdi-inflows was probably impaired by
the government's involvement in joint ventures in heavy indus-
tries in the past. As in the case of debt finance, improvements
in the efficiency and productivity of fdi are to be expected if
fdi-projects were no longer intertwined with the government's
attempts to foster heavy industrialization and a more equitable
distribution of income and wealth.
1
Sometimes domestic investors complain about a bias in incen-
tives against them and in favour of foreign investors. It is
thus important to note that the proposed liberal treatment of
fdi must not involve any privilegies at the expense of domestic
investors; the latter should rather be given the same liberal
treatment.
o
In order to achieve a more equitable distribution of income and
wealth, policies should be adopted which do not interfere with
the allocation of economic resources and which minimize adverse
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Table A2 - Breakdown of Fdi-Projects According to Domestic-
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